Iran’s tough questions

Tehran is fighting the Syrian regime’s battles for survival as if they were its own. Tehran viewed the latest battles in Damascus and Aleppo as “the battles for defending Tehran Qom and Mashhad”. This is attributed to many reasons and motives, tackled intensely by analysts during the past year and a half, stemming mostly from “the regional role theory”, the “sectarian component”, the “conflict for the leadership of the Muslim world” and “defending national interests”.  But the questions that still preoccupy analysts the most revolve mainly around the length Iranians may go to in their reaction to the fall of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad; or the ousting of his regime whether through an “internal coup” or “large scale splits” within the army, security and the regime. Or through a foreign military intervention regardless of its excuses or “covers” of providing “safe havens” or “securing Syrian weapons of mass destruction” which was the subject of much talk lately. “Iran will not allow the enemy to advance in Syria” goes a statement by the Iranian deputy Chief of Staff Masoud Jazayeri. According to “Iranian leaks”, Tehran informed Ankara that it will not stand with its hands tied in case of any Turkish military intervention against Syria. Statements and hints are being passed by Iran and its allies in the region waving at the choice of “turning the tables on everyone” or the “Sampson choice”. Where is the truth from all this huge heap of stances and leaks injected to the media and through it to all those concerned? Where is the truth in this flood of Iranian contradictory statements around Syria, coming from conflicting streams and power entities that characterised the “Islamic republic” experiment and its performance along the past three decades? It is certain that Iran will fight the Assad battle to the end. If it fails in preserving the regime and its head together, it will fight the battle to save the regime without its head and president. This is a truth to which there’s no doubt, and it was translated actually in “the vein of Iranian financial, economic, military, and security support to the regime in Syria”, which was sufficient so far to guarantee the flow of life into the tightening veins of the regime. Tehran will continue to stand by Al-Assad out of a concept of preserving “national interest” mainly, and considering Damascus as the first defence line for Tehran’s role in the East, the fertile crescent and the Arab Israeli conflict, not to mention the sectarian motives that cannot be denied in a country whose constitution is based on the “authority of the sect”. We have no doubts entirely that Tehran will be the last to forsake the Syrian regime. It is more likely, however, that Iran will not enter into a large scale regional war in defence of the Assad regime, even assuming foreign military intervention (with Turkish participation or facilitation). Although “reducing the interests of the regime in Tehran” requires backing the Assad regime, the priority for Tehran remains in keeping the regime first, what compels its cornerstones and authorities to refrain from entering into a risk that may end in exterminating the regime, in which scenario there would be no use at all talking about “interests” or “a role” or a “sect”. Along the quarter century of the “Islamic revolution” rule in Iran, the state with its institutions and religious authority, the Supreme Guide, showed a very high degree of pragmatism. They knew when to be extreme and when to be moderate, when to shoot and when to hold their fire, when to advance and when to retreat. It has been evidently proven that the “Iranian interest” is much stronger than the system of values and principles governing the country and its intellectual and political project (although not a unique characteristic to the Iranian regime in any case). The proof to this is that Iran did not leave any card in its hand without using it in its foreign policy. They supported Christian Georgia against Shiite Azerbaijan, “facilitated” Washington’s occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq before turning against it. They fought Al-Qaeda as a Wahabi fundamentalist, elitist, anti-Shiite movement, but kept contact with its active members and embraced some of its key leaders. It supported “revolutionary” regimes and generously supported regimes allied with “global arrogance” as long as the interest required all this and that and thus. Iran's final stance from the results of the Syrian crisis will be decided within view of the developments and scenarios arising, and their effect on the countries of the region, especially Lebanon and Iraq, where Iran has interests and power clear to the eye of the beholder. In different cases, Iran will not resort to the “Sampson choice”. This is not the Iranian leadership “style”, or its method and Iran is first and foremost not compelled to resort to it. Supposing a “foreign intervention” does take place, Iran has stockpiled huge experience in making the lives of Americans, Europeans, and NATO nations in occupied countries (Iraq and Afghanistan) very difficult. It will most probably draw on these two models while formulating its upcoming strategy toward Syria. The problem with such a “scenario” is that it directly assumes an occupation of Syrian land, what the different parties nominated for such a role (probably with the exception of Turkey) do not consider. The scenario of the militias affiliated with pro-Iran powers and sects may be one that Iran thinks will diminish its share of the “Syrian cake”. This too is open for consideration, since there is fertile land forming in Syria currently for the growth of "militias” and “armed tribesmen” and maybe “awakenings”. Iran has proved to be a veteran in this field. Whatever happens, Iran deals with the Syrian regime as if it is staying forever and at the same time makes post -regime preparations as if it is going to fall tomorrow. Someone who thinks that Assad's fall or ouster will stop the bloodshed, fighting, and civil war in Syria is erroneous. And someone who thinks that Assad’s remaining on top of Syria and the regime also can stop the massacres, battles, explosions and assassinations is also wrong. Syria has entered into the “dark tunnel” and will not be able to come out until the regional and international parties active in the crisis reach the conviction that things never stay the same and that the time has come for a settlement/deal that would take Syria to a new era, and I will not say for “democracy” because what Syria awaits makes thinking of “democracy” an unaffordable luxury. --- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.