Jordan: a profit and loss statement

Jordan can neither join a list of winners benefiting from the "Arab spring" nor join a list of losers. It has incurred both profits and losses, even as its final statement of account is still being processed. Most probably, this statement will not be finalized until a clear picture has emerged of the changes and transitions taking place in various Arab countries, especially Syria. When we speak of Jordan, we mean the Jordanian regime per se. Until around April of this year, the regime was on shaky ground due to losing key allies in Egypt and Tunisia. Strong revolutionary winds seemed to be sweeping Amman and the capital cities of other moderate Arab states. An express train of change seemed to be moving at high speed from one capital to another, uprooting ostensibly "well-established" regimes. It had occurred to no one that these regimes would collapse so promptly and effortlessly. Then the "express train" parked for a long time at its Libya station, where it faced ferocious resistance by the regime and its forces. Moreover, the regime in Yemen could not be toppled. And Bahrain's leaders, with direct military support from Saudi Arabia and additional Gulf countries as well as Jordan, were able to contain the "intifada" of that country's Shiite majority. These developments helped the Jordanian regime dismiss fears of comprehensive and unexpected change and cool down the momentum of protests that emerged in parallel with the Arab revolts. As the revolutionary wave struck Syria, and Damascus became the focus of international attention in the aftermath of the Gaddafi regime's collapse, Jordan and the Gulf countries appeared more resilient. Indeed, the Jordanian regime can boast that not a single person has been killed throughout an entire year of protests and demonstrations. This is striking, considering the accelerated level of violence employed by the Syrian authorities next door in oppressing the people's protests and the consequent rising toll of dead and injured Syrians. The regime in Jordan has succeeded in opening the doors wide for the option of political reform. That reform might be incomplete or insufficient, but it remains the best and the most daring compared with all other initiatives launched by Arab regimes and governments. Still, there are three developments that have not yet matured or crystallized. At the end of the day, it is these developments that will decide if Jordan's profit and loss scale tilts toward the winners or losers list. Firstly, the Arab Islamic movements have witnessed a phase of resurrection and are poised to accede to or share power in a number of Arab countries, including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria. This is bound to impact the future relationship between the regime in Amman and the Jordanian Islamic movement (Muslim Brotherhood); undoubtedly, that impact will favor the Islamists. Accordingly, one can say that Jordan should be fully aware that the second decade of the third millennium belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam throughout the region. Can Jordan be an exception to this rule? Secondly, strong opposition blocs have begun to dominate the Jordanian tribes that constitute the historical backbone of the regime and its traditional base of loyalty. During the past ten months, the populous (Transjordan) areas have witnessed the emergence of youth and social action movements that strongly oppose the regime. The king's power and authority have been heavily challenged by Jordanian tribal figures and youth groups. It has become clear to all that the increasing calls for a constitutional monarchy hide a strong inclination to consecrate the "Jordanian identity" of the ruling system and the state in Jordan and that, for the first time, this inclination has collided with the "Hashemite identity and agenda" instead of challenging the Palestinian identity--which was the case for decades in the past. Thirdly, we encounter a fear strongly and publicly voiced by ruling circles in Jordan regarding the failure and collapse of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process and the deteriorating likelihood of the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. This fear depicts a solution for the Palestinian cause outside Palestine and at the expense of Jordan. Many Jordanians, including the king himself, are warning that Israel could exploit instability in Jordan and the region--that it could in fact promote instability to generate a state of "creative anarchy" that generates substantial change in Jordan--whereupon Jordan with its Palestinian majority would become the scene of the liquidation of the Palestinian cause. This scenario used to be the scarecrow used by some Jordanian politicians to score local political gains. Now it is mainstream Jordanian, with the king personally warning of the inclination of the mainstream of the Hebrew state, led by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, to embrace the "alternative homeland" plan and solve the Palestinian issue in Jordan. This is an unprecedented development that will have repercussions for both the peace process and Jordanian-Israeli relations. In brief, the Arab revolts that have reshuffled the rules of the game and caused an imbalance in relations and balances among powers in the region require Jordan to tread cautiously in a field of "landmines" and unforeseen events. The moderate Arab camp has become weaker, yet the resistance camp at the other end of the Arab spectrum is nearly dismantled and its impact fading. None of us can predict the future of Arab political systems. No one can foresee what attitudes and policies will be adopted. Yet one fact appears to be true amidst the fog of the moment: the regime in Jordan is no longer capable of ruling on the basis of its old media, tactics, alliances and tools.