Rihaniyya bombings… onset of a crisis?

Those who followed the terrorist bombings in Rihaniyya, southern Turkey, may have detected the smell of intelligence, and when intelligence is involved in a crime, the door remains open to various possibilities, though public attention is usually focused on the stakeholders and the goals they intended to achieve through this or that heinous act. As for the timing, the bombings came a few days after the end of the Kerry-Putin-Lavrov talks in Moscow. The initiative was the first in a year to pave the way for a political solution to the Syrian crisis. It infuriated supporters of "decisive, military, international intervention," the axis that still beat the drum of war in Syria. It is in this axis’ interest to do everything in its power to abort any chance of a political solution, as it has done before. What is also significant is that the Rihaniyya bombings coincided with high-level Turkish talks about "the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime" against the opposition, where evidence Ankara claimed to be solid and firm was presented. Talk of weapons and explosions suggests a reconsideration of decisive military international intervention in Syria. This impression is reinforced by Turkish officials' immediate accusations of Damascus, their immediate recalling of envoys, their holding the international community responsible for the bombings following its reluctance to intervene in the Syrian crisis early on. This is just one of many readings of the terrorist event of Rihaniyya. There has been talk of the involvement of "a left-wing organisation" that used to carry out terrorist attacks inside Turkey and which Turks accuse Syrian intelligence services of backing. And there are those who believe that the bombings might be the work of a jihadist group such as we have come to know over the past 20 or 30 years. It is feasible that Damascus could be accused of backing al-Qaeda and the Nusra front. In the world of the absurd, all scenarios seem possible. Anyhow, we do not know what really happened, so we hope that Turkish authorities reveal the results of a transparent and impartial investigation into this horrible act, without formulating a policy, as is usual in such circumstances. Anyway, anyone following the situation along Syrian-Turkish borders will not be surprised to see news of this kind. Turkish border cities and towns have turned into a theatre for all intelligence services, terrorist organisations, armed gangs, arms dealers, and national and non-national opposition groups in Syria. Border crossings have become safe corridors for transporting weapons, insurgents, spies, fighters, hostages and hijackers. These are the repercussions of the Syrian earthquake on Turkey. Ankara seems to have succeeded, thus far, in containing the impact of the Kurdish factor through the agreement it made with Kurdish opposition leader Abdullah Öcalan towards a political solution to the Kurdish crisis. However, the future is threatened by an awakening Alawite factor in Turkey domestic politics, especially given the climate of sectarian polarisation in Syria and Ankara's slow shift towards increasingly sectarian Sunni discourse. It is perhaps for this reason that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in a moment of rage and anger, expressed his rejection of Damascus’ attempts to lure his country into the "most dangerous scenario," which is Syria’s current sectarian quagmire. Erdogan avoided discussing how this would happen, though he knows better than others that various factions and the Sunni militant opposition, combined with the presence of more than a quarter of a million Syrian refugees, mostly Sunnis, in Alawite-dominated Turkish border areas will definitely raise problems and challenges. Unless the Syrian crisis is resolved peacefully, Ankara will find it difficult to contain these problems and challenges, because a war would certainly affect Turkey from the inside. Prolonging the Syrian crisis, by all means, is not in Turkey’s interest. I think that different reactions to the Rihaniyya bombings, and Turkish debates as to the context and those responsible, are the tip of an iceberg of controversy and division awaiting Turkey in the coming days. This irks Turkish leaders, and makes them less patience and tactful in dealing with the Syrian crisis. Whether it was an intelligence initiative to put the military intervention option back on the table, or an act of terrorism by the left or al-Qaeda, events in Rihaniyya definitely make Turkey a touchstone of the Syrian crisis. It proves what we had already warned of, that Ankara shot itself in the foot. It is neither able to resolve the battle with the Syrian regime by extreme means, nor to play the role of diplomatic mediator, though it is the most qualified to do so by virtue of its closeness to the regime and the opposition alike. Turkey will pay a very high price for its policies, as its rival in Damascus has done, whose back is now against the wall with nothing to lose. Turkey’s situation could be described by the verse: "We chase power or die for it with our excuses." The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.