Tragedy for the Canal regions and the Brotherhood's backwardness

Egypt's true problem, frankly, is that no-one there wants to look reality squarely in the eye. For over six decades — ever since July 23 1952, the date of the military coup on King Farouk — Egypt has been on a backwards journey: a journey back into everything bad in every possible area, especially in the social field.The current situation goes much further beyond the Suez Canal region's cities which are rising up against the new regime which the Muslim Brotherhood are seeking to impose on the country. It is the problem of the whole of Egypt, where there are still those willing to resist. There are among Egypt's youths and politicians those who have retained faith in the possibility that life and hope will return to the country despite the catastrophe that has struck it. This catastrophe lies, firstly in the sheer weight of the military regime that was founded in 1952, and secondly, in the fact that those who have succeeded the military seek to conduct a repeat performance. What Egypt needs right now is a real revolution. Egyptian society, however, may be unable to carry out such a revolution, because it begins with acknowledging that the Egyptian patient can't be treated without first putting a stop to the unruly growth of population. Is there in Egypt now a ruler or an official that could admit to there or dare say in public that there is a country that is mostly desert has a population-growth problem? This is the straightforward question that could pave the way for others relating to politics, the economy, tourism, agriculture, the Nile's water, improving education and making use of foreign expertise without any hang-ups. What was dubbed 'the Revolution of July 23' was nothing but a military putsch carried out by a handful of army officers who wanted to turn cities into the countryside instead of seeking to reconcile themselves with urban centres or learn from them and their cultural values across the world. So they brought an end to most beautiful or civilised aspects of Egypt. They killed Cairo, the jewel in the crown; all the cities along the Suez Canal, including Port Said and Ismailia; Alexandria, which had been the pearl of the Mediterranean and Helwan, formerly an exemplary city. Where does change begin? It begins with acknowledging that it is not possible to follow in the footsteps of the military whose rule was established by Gamal Abdel Nasser. It is not enough to criticise former president Hosni Mubarak and his actions for things to turn around. Mubarak's era was only the conclusion to a regime that was conceived in 1952 and which gradually changed the nature of Egyptian society and helped created this disparity between the nouveau riche and the working classes which drowned in ignorance and extremism for a variety of factors including the slogans promulgated after the so-called 'July Revolution.' Only after this has been acknowledged can the largest and most vital Arab state start on its way towards reform to assume again some parts of its natural role, even in art, culture, film and theatre. What's happening now, however, is that the Muslim Brotherhood are out to repeat the military's performance, but in a different costume and with the extra aid that President Mohammed Morsi was elected. The Brotherhood choose to forget that elections are meaningless unless they serve as a step down the path of entrenching a democratic life built on, first and foremost, state institutions that are independent from partisanship. To be even plainer, reality must be looked squarely in the eye for the situation in Egypt to be turned around. To start, this means asking why the cities of the canal region which are now rising up against power and the Brotherhood, turn into miserable cities after having once flourished? These cities, which could play a key role in revitalising the whole country, were subjected to extreme injustice under the military and have now moved on to suffering from the Brotherhood's backwardness. The injustice had its inception in the domination of the chauvinistic bent over all else, especially after the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in 1956 and the subsequent 'triple aggression' which struck Egypt. The British, French and Israeli attack was inexcusable, but we must acknowledge in return that it was the White House and Dwight Eisenhower's administration which intervened to end the aggression. There is also no escaping the question: Was it necessary to nationalise the canal? Did Egypt gain by the nationalisation, or did it sustain irremediable loss with the departure of its resident Europeans, the resulting impoverishment of cities and the change that affected their quarters, gardens, streets, shops, restaurants and cultural and social life? The military successfully altered the nature of the Egyptian people. They sold the public a fictitious victory the meaning of which it didn't comprehend until after the 1967 defeat which led to the closure of the Suez Canal, further increasing the surrounding cities' poverty and misery. The canal was reopened by a man who sought to reconcile Egypt with itself, its people and its surrounding environment. His name was Anwar Sadat. Sadat couldn't extricate Egypt from the predicament it was in despite reaching a peace agreement with Israel and recovering Sinai. He was killed by the forces he wished to use to get rid of the remains of Abdel Nasser's police state which has ruined a sizeable part of the Arab world, including Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Hosni Mubarak repeated Sadat's failure. He couldn't change anything about the Egyptian public's nature and revive the middle class which could in turn have revived towns and the countryside. Moreover, he decided to surrender to the Muslim Brotherhood and allow them to disseminate their culture. He seemed to repress them but didn't take practical measures to fight the culture they wanted to spread. And so it is quite natural now for the Brotherhood to continue on the same path aiming to change the nature of the Egyptian public, having successfully hijacked 'the January 25 revolution' and marginalised its true instigators. It is also yet more natural that civil disobedience should begin in the canal region. These cities retain memories of the days of opulence, and especially remember that they have tremendous resources, largely linked to the Suez Canal and the proximity to both the Gulf and Europe. To some Egyptian youths, these cities represent holding on to an Egypt that is open to the world and capable to bank on its main resource: its people.  Egypt which has brought forth Mohammed Abdel Wahab, Omm Kulthum, el-Sunbati and dozens more; Egypt which has risen up first in the face of the military and now in the face of the Brotherhood, who have nothing to give but empty slogans that serve no purpose but tightening their grip on power. Does the Brotherhood's lust for power justify recovering military rule in Egypt? The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.