Morsi's victory: Islamic realism or an end to idealism?

Before coming to power, Abdul Malek Bin Marawan was one of the most famous Omayad Caliphs. He was renowned for his religious piety and commitment to worship and prayer, such that he was nicknamed "Dove of the Mosque". When he learned of his father’s death and that power had transferred to him, the Holy Koran lay open in his lap. He closed the Holy book and uttered his immortal line: “This is your last pledge.” During the period of his rule, Abdul Malek went through a metamorphosis, transforming from a dove of the mosque, into a political tiger -- an altogether very different creature. A lot can be learned through analysing the transformation of Abdul Malek and placing it into an everyday context, but the important thing to acknowledge here is that this metamorphosis is a generalisation not an exception. The transformation of people from a state of "perfection" to one of "reality", brings with it complexities as well as gifts. It’s not new to say that this form of generalisation permeates all cultures, civilisations and ideologies wherever they may be. Of course there are varying degrees of this transformation or paradigm -- some are partial and inconclusive, while others are complete and wonderful. At the same time, it doesn’t mean that everyone becomes a ‘political monster’ when they enter the frame of real politics. Where ideology collides with reality after attaining power, two overall trends can be observed through examining history: the first is a gradual subordination of ideology towards reality. The second is an intransigence towards ideology which then fights with reality in order to radically change it and reshape life as it sees fit. The first trend is the most dominant throughout human history as it is closer to the natural rhythm of life, while the second has led to some of the worst disasters and genocides mankind has experienced, where ideology insists on the manipulation of life as its adherents perceive it. Nazism is the best and ugliest example, demonstrating a dogma that wants to mould the world into a brutal, genocidal instrument. Stalin's communism approached that of Nazism in its attempt to meld the people of the Soviet Union republics socially, economically and culturally -- a policy that prepared for the inevitable collapse of the Soviet experiment. George Orwell's seminal novel ‘Animal Farm’ depicted an impressive portrayal of how the communist ideology was interpreted by Stalin, which was a brutality at odds with reality, where he described the manipulation of people (or animals in the case of this political satire) into ready-made ideological stereotypes. The closest example is the experience of China's Mao Tse-Tung, which almost arrived at a similar catastrophic end as the Soviet Union, except that the great rescue came because of the pragmatic Chinese Communist Party who has left only name and description of its communism. Therefore, either the ideology conforms with reality, improving it gradually, or it turns into a disaster where the reality turns in on itself, then collapses. Generally, the ideologue places the dream in front of his followers, and provides them with a tremendous energy to mobilise, work and struggle. But as soon as it sees victory and becomes empowered and collides with the ceiling of reality, so it starts to adapt itself according to its new discovery and then rationalisation sets in. In its ebullient phase, ideology doesn’t believe in compromises, but only its absolute reason and the invalidity of the others’ arguments. There are no shades of grey in the closed ideology. There is only black and white. On the other hand, rationality and pragmatic realism are based on compromises and bargaining with a wider colour spectrum where grey takes centre-stage and occupies a broader space. The ideologue gives one decisive solutions for all dilemmas occurring in society, countries, universe, life and existence, and it is usually a superior solution which looks down on other solutions The rational pragmatic realism, instead, offers hesitating approaches, none of them is described as a ‘solution’ but only attempts to improve, develop and reach common ground. The ideologue justifies the ideological party’s stand-alone government which doesn’t believe in coalition governments and meeting others halfway, because it would hinder the application of the ideological plan on earth. The rational and pragmatic ideology is based on alliance and coalition with the other's policy, dismantling political plans and re-composing them as appropriate depending on the circumstances and time in question. For all the the above reasons, Abdul Malek Bin Marwan realised from the very first moment that requirements of reality, would not allow him to stay in the tower of religious purity if he wanted to be in power and practice politics. This early perception should be considered by the Islamic Movements who came to power at the time of Arab revolutions. A quick overview of the Islamic experience and their rule from Iran to Sudan andfrom Afghanistan to Turkey, and finally to Gaza confirms the progress of these experiences of the general context towards collision between the ideology and the reality. In all these experiences there is much to be said and written, but the great common thread here is that the level of success and failure that has characterised each of these experiences was related to the response by the ruling Islamic party to the pragmatic conditions and requirements and trying to improve it. Whenever the ruler, Islamic or not, deals with reality and its complexity starting from the modesty of politics to make a difference, and not from the arrogance and pride of the ideology, it has better success. Regarding the Islamists, the Justice and Development Party's experience in Turkey was the most successful as it was the most rational and pragmatic Islamic party. The rest of the experiences were moving in failed circles on different levels as they remained trapped in the ideology and its ready-made forms and didn’t have the courage to break out and confront the horizons of reality. But all the Islamists’ experiences, especially the Arabs, are in one court and that of the Brotherhood in Egypt in another, because of the importance of Egypt and its centrality and because their movement is the founder and the ‘mother of the Islamic movements’. For this reason, the Brotherhood’s arrival to power after the January revolution is considered an historic turning point in all senses of the word. Their political experience, its results and where it will end up, will have a huge impact on all the political Islamic forces in the region, and may also determine the balance of the intellectual power there for many generations. The big question, intellectually and politically, is whether Mohammed Morsi’s arrival at the seat of power in Egypt will be the beginning of the rationalisation of the current Islamic ideology, and thus fitting into the pragmatic, realistic and alliance model (as in the Turkish style), or falling into the temptation of the persistence of the ideology and trying to impose it on the society thinking that it is possible to shape the reality according to ideological assumptions (as in the Iranian or Stalinist style). Most probably, it is estimated that the experience of the Egyptian Islamists will be far from the Iranian experience for many objective reasons, and will not be a copy of the Turkish experience. In the Brotherhood context in Egypt, or any other Sunni context, there is no religious reference for a Shia pattern that can be transformed into political and religious authorities, trespassing the regime and imposing itself on society while surrounding itself with a close circle of holiness and immunity. Sunni religious references are weak, luckily for their communities, and they are either political religious references belonging to organisations and parties which have power only over the members of the organisation and a small circle around it, or official religious references belonging to the traditional organisations which also have no power over the community. Religious ‘decentralisation’ in the Sunni tradition leaves more space open to criticism, chaos and creativity even though it also gives others space for terrorism and the emergence of conflicting emirs and groups on the margins of the main parties. The second important difference between the Iranian experience and the Egyptian one in terms of Islamist rule is that the first enjoyed the presence of oil through which it was able to control the society and enforce its power according to the rentier state pattern, and through that it maintains authoritarian rule which doesn’t need others on the local scene. In Egypt, there are no rich resources controlled by the ruling government through which the community’s loyality can be bought or controlled, which implies that any democratically elected ruler can surrender to the logic of open economy, import development and establish alliances with the other parties. As the ideologies of Marxism, nationalism and renaissance ended their power either due to the disappearance of its extreme formulas, or its rationalisation and reinvention if it wanted to survive in political life, so we will see the same in the middle and near future about political Islam. The great victory achieved by Islamists in Egypt at this historical moment in the region will be the beginning of the end of the solid Islamic ideology as we know it, and we will see it adapting to the reality and pragmatic contexts, willingly or unwillingly. -- The views expressed by the author do not necessarily represent or reflect the editorial policy of Arabstoday.